Abstract—Current RFID ultralightweight authentication protocols have security pitfalls; thus, SURV, a potentially high-security protocol, based on the use of on-tag lightweight cryptography and on-reader standard cryptography, is proposed. Furthermore, the updating of internal values is only executed on tags and conditioned to a successful mutual authentication, which prunes desynchronization attacks. Results of performance and security analysis of SURV, and comparison with existing protocols, are presented.

Index Terms—Authentication, lightweight cryptography, privacy, RFID, security.

Muaway Naser is with the Computer Science & IT Department, Higher College of Technology, UAE. Yazn Alshamaila is with the Business Information Systems Department, King Abdullah II School for Information Technology, The University of Jordan, Jordan. Rahmat Budiarto is with the Smart Networked Computing Research Group, College of Computer Science & Information Technology, Albaha University, KSA. Pedro Peris-Lopez is with the Computer Security Lab (COSEC), Computer Science Department, Carlos III University of Madrid, Spain.

Cite:Muaway Naser, Yazn Alshamaila, Rahmat Budiarto, Pedro Peris-Lopez, "SURV: Shelled Ultralightweight Randomized Value Authentication Protocol for Low-Cost RFID Tags," International Journal of Computer and Electrical Engineering vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 206-214, 2015.